Introduction
In Rethinking the Region (ALLEN et al, 1998) , we (and Doreen Massey) were at pains to stress that regions are 'a series of open, discontinuous spaces constituted by the social relationships which stretch across them in a variety of ways' (p. 5). They are formed out of a nexus of relations and connections, much of which takes its shape from elsewhere. In today's language, regions are a product of networked flows and relations fixed in a more or less provisional manner. Our concern was to show the South East of
England as a neo-liberal heartland, the product of overlapping social, political and economic relations which stretched across space in ways that showed little or no respect for the regional boundaries imposed upon them. Massey has gone on to emphasise the importance of understanding 'space as an open and ongoing production' (MASSEY, 2005, p. 55) , rather than trying to capture it as some fixed expression of territory. This relational approach is consistent with a number of other attempts to capture the uncertain ways in which regions are created and recreated through networked social relationships (see, for example, AMIN, 2004 , PAASI, 2001 ).
Yet such attempts have clearly not dispelled the doubts and suspicions that the case against a vision of bounded, territorially fixed regions has been exaggerated (see JONES and MACLEOD, 2004) . Perhaps understandably, the urge to draw lines around spatial regions, to know the limits of political authority, is one that is not easy to stifle. It does, after all, chime with many everyday political practices in a way that the symbolism of a more diffuse, somewhat nebulous, regionalism does not. Indeed, we were only too aware that our conceptualization of the region sat uneasily with attempts to define or understand regions through clusters of connected economic activities -as pre-existing 'crucibles' of growth (WARD and JONAS, 2004 explore similar issues). We were also markedly conscious that it fits still more uneasily with visions of regions as territorially bounded political constructions through which traditional forms of electoral accountability can be delivered. Much of our argument, it has to be said, was couched in economic termsgrowth mechanisms, neo-liberal market forces, and such -which fit well with the language of network and flows. Rightly or wrongly, however, political institutions, lend themselves to the language of territory, fixity and boundaries. They evoke a sense of embeddedness in their performance and practice, one that is echoed in recent discussions about the potential of regional politics (where the drive to elected assemblies in England -mimicking the 'regional' structures of Europe, Germany, Spain and maybe even French decentralisation -nonetheless ended in failure for the regional agenda when the North East of England voted against such an assembly) (see RALLINGS and THRASHER, 2006) .
Even with the onset of a more pluralist governance discourse and the wider range of institutional actors that such a shift entails, we would argue that the territorial focus has remained much the same, despite a more flexible spatial vocabulary that speaks about regionalisation and the re-scaling of the state. While a focus on territoriality may not necessarily imply the existence of fixed and stable boundaries (see, e.g., MORGAN, 2002) in many respects the vocabulary has remained trapped within a framework that attempts to identify new territorial settlements, even if the size and nature of the territories has changed, from neighbourhoods -and parishes -to city-regions and beyond, with some suggesting that city-regions may provide the basis for a new territorial political fix, albeit with 'fuzzy' boundaries and through the building of 'coalitions for change' rather than the creation of new institutions through structural reform (HARDING et al, 2006, p.37 
(DEPARTMENT FOR COMMUNITIES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, 2006). Even if
it is recognised that no particular scale currently has 'primacy', there seems to be an expectation that this is just a transitory phenomenon (see, e.g. JESSOP, 2006a) .
It would seem that the language of territorial politics is not only stubborn, but equally that it cannot simply be wished away by some conceptual wand, since it is itself a powerful political construction (HUDSON, 2006; JONES and MACLEOD, 2004; PAASI, 2002 PAASI, , 2004 . Assemblies, regional development agencies, and the like, are performed as territorial entities which try to hold down the fluid elements of global life in the general interest of their 'regions' -seeking to generate fixity 'through processes of government and governance' (GOODWIN et al, 2005, p. 423) . Regional political institutions define themselves in relation to 'other regions', both in order to compete for public funds and to give them an identity around which it is possible to mobilise other forms of support. In doing so, they represent themselves as coherent, collaborative entities which have to compete and learn. But, and this is to acknowledge the point, the outcome is always a political construction. The diverse ways in which the 'coherence' of a region is constructed and acted upon by different, and often new, political actors is the result of a complex set of political mobilisations at any one point in time (constructing regions as 'imagined communities') (KEATING et al, 2003) . In short, as we stressed in our account of the South East of England as a neo-liberal growth region, the invention and re-invention of regions is a constant.
What appears to be less well understood, however, is that in the current political moment regions are being remade in ways that directly undermine the idea of a region as a meaningful territorial entity. As we see it, the governance of regions, and its spatiality, now works through a looser, more negotiable, set of political arrangements that take their shape from the networks of relations that stretch across and beyond given regional boundaries. The agencies, the partnerships, the political intermediaries, and the associations and connections that bring them together, increasingly form 'regional' spatial assemblages that are not exclusively regional, but bring together elements of central, regional and local institutions. In the process, we believe that a more fluid set of regional political relationships and power-plays has emerged which call into question the usefulness of continuing to represent regions politically as territorially fixed in any essential sense.
In the first part of the paper, we restate our sense of regions, and specifically the 
The reinvention of the South-East of England
Elsewhere we have forcefully argued that, in the 1980s and 1990s, the 'South East' was best understood as a 'growth' region and specifically a region of neo-liberal growth (ALLEN et al, 1998) . Its national dominance was expressed through this understanding which reflected a particular confluence of political, cultural and economic dynamics (see also, AMIN et al, 2003) . Although the South East was presented as a model of deregulated growth, in practice it relied on a high degree of state intervention, both to achieve particular forms of 'deregulation' which tended to advantage the South East and to deliver significant investment in large scale infrastructure (for example, investments associated with road construction, from by-passes to the M25, the outer circular road around London). In other words, if this was a 'neo-liberal' region it was not some sort of inevitable outcome of inexorable global market forces but was rather the product of a clearly articulated state strategy, which was underpinned by substantial investment in social, as well as economic, infrastructure. In this discussion, it is important to restate that the 'South East' with which we are concerned is not limited to the government region'; that is, the 'region' of the regional assembly, the government office or the regional development agency. We continue to approach the South East through its status as a growth region and the cross-cutting social and political, as well as economic, dynamics associated with that understanding. This means not only that it stretches far beyond the 'standard' region for some forms of economic and cultural relationships (for example it reaches to Cambridge through the threads connected to the high technology industries and likewise is pulled towards Wiltshire by the strands of the luxury -'country' -housing market, as well as embracing the M4 corridor), but also that there are substantial spatio- 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 From this perspective, the region itself is territorially discontinuous, in the sense that some places officially defined as being in the South East turn out not to be (for example, much of Kent and the coastal South, see also ROBSON et al, 2006) while other places located far away from the accredited borders of the region should be seen as part of it, precisely because they are so tightly connected through dense networks of economic and cultural relations. Such a claim is perhaps less contentious these days as material developments have prompted reflections which focus on the identification of a 'Greater South East'. In some respects, our interpretation of the region is consistent with the approach adopted by GORDON (2003 GORDON ( , 2004 , who has argued strongly for the identification of a 'greater' South East as a super region, as 'a regionalized version of Although BUCK et al (2002) are primarily concerned with London, they, too, confirm that the economic strengths of the metropolitan region are associated with the region's fringes as much as its core. There is, of course, still a danger in all this that the task is defined as being to identify some new, more or less fixed, set of boundaries for this emergent region and we remain sceptical of any such attempts, even as the boundaries are shifted ever further outwards. Indeed, MARVIN et al (2006) argue that the current position is one in which there is an 'implicit' regional strategy which tends to benefit the so-called 'London super-region'.
The main drivers of this unspoken strategy are identified as responses to 'market failure', which are specifically expressed in initiatives such as the Sustainable Communities Plan and associated with infrastructural investment intended to ensure that there is sufficient 'affordable' housing for key workers in the region (see, e.g., RACO, 2006) . Moreover, the South East has had to be actively constructed as a 'region', rather than simply be the place through which the nation is defined (see, for example, AMIN et al, 2003 , COCHRANE, 2006a . The regionalisation of the South East -its re-imagination as a region -has opened up spaces for new policy actors and has also, in effect, led to the 'region' playing a rather different role within the policy imaginary that constitutes the UK. Nationally, the South East is constructed as a key driver of economic success; within the EU it is repositioned as a metropolitan region under pressure to maintain and improve its competitive position and specifically to transform itself into a knowledge economy;
globally, of course, it is presented as facing dramatic challenges from the newly emergent MUSSON et al 2002 , SEEDA 1999 , 2002a . In other words, the drive to regional competitiveness is identified as a British as well as a global imperative. Likewise, the aim of the South East's Regional Economic Strategy for 2002 -2012 is to ensure that the region is acknowledged to be one of the fifteen 'top performing regional economies' in the world (SEEDA, 2002b, p. 8) and if it fails to claim its rightful place among Europe's elite regions then, it is implied, the UK (and the UK's other regions, cities and devolved nations) will also suffer. The most recent Regional Economic Strategy is perhaps somewhat less confident about the position of the South East, identifying it as one of the 'most prosperous regions globally', but performing relatively weakly against them and facing a series of challenges (SEEDA, 2006, pp 7-8, 21-28) . Nevertheless, the overall vision remains upbeat -to ensure 'that the South East will be a world class region achieving sustainable prosperity' (SEEDA, 2006, p.29) .
What this amounts to, in our view, is that the South East, or rather its governing agencies, have learnt to mobilise the language of regionalism in order to justify an active growth politics, albeit one suitably moderated to incorporate the demands of sustainability, itself mobilised politically by residents keen to preserve the amenities of the Home Counties. This is a political process through which differences are negotiated without ever being made explicit or subject to open political challenge. In this context, Above all, this has involved a process of negotiation between government and regionally based agencies which, in the process of mobilizing around spatial approximations of the region to steer decisions in their favour, distend and distort the geographies of the South East to suit their own political ends. In doing so, however, they seem to deny the territorially discontinuous nature of the regional inventions, which they themselves perform and operate through. Ironically, this perhaps can itself be seen as the product of newly emerged regional governance structures that have led to, and indeed reflect, more tangled arrangements of power.
New political arrangements
SANDFORD (2005) is persuasive in suggesting that the new regional governance institutions in England have, in a relatively short time period, become a taken for granted feature of sub-national governance throughout the country and not just in the traditional that it is possible to identify a series of relatively autonomous institutions of the region, such as regional networks, regional development agencies and regional chambers (made up of local authority representatives and representatives of business, the voluntary and community sectors), as well as government agencies which are located within its spatial
remit, yet remain directly responsible to the centre.
Across the South East of England a range of governance agencies has emerged of late, some more explicitly engaged in making up the region and defining their own role within it than others, which survive and operate within the context of more diffuse and fragmented forms of governance. The existing governance structures of the Greater South
East include an elected assembly and elected mayor in London, regional chambers supposedly representing 'stakeholders', three regional development agencies, three regionally based central government offices, regional and London-wide local government associations, and much more. But this fragmentation does not necessarily mean that the arrangement is politically muddled. On the contrary, the nature of the overlapping and intersecting sets of formal and informal institutional arrangements helps to ensure that the broad direction of policy is more or less taken for granted, in a form that JESSOP (2004) calls 'metagovernance' yet without the necessity for a 'metagovernment'. Such political In fact, the search for bounded territories, within which electoral accountability may be constructed or state authority mobilised, has actively understated the emergence of different sorts of politics and forms of governance. In practice, it has proved impossible to construct institutional arrangements that can be captured by existing regional boundaries. This is perhaps most immediately apparent in the creation of a number of cross-regional planning areas and partnership agencies in the context of the central government sponsored Sustainable Communities Plan, whose ambition is to deliver housing on a scale that is capable of underpinning continuing 'regional' and thus national growth (ODPM 2003) . Arrangements in the major growth areas, as noted, stretch across existing regional boundaries and link together government departments, government sponsored agencies and new 'partnership' institutions (including a series of so-called local delivery vehicles), although none of them are fixed or set in their geography. Again, we are witnessing political relationships and linkages which stretch beyond and cross-cut the official region's already porous boundaries.
It is tempting to believe that these emergent arrangements may constitute or provide spaces of representation for regional elites, but this would be to exaggerate the status of such elites, as well as implying that we are seeing the creation of a more homogeneous, regionally based economic and political formation than exists in practice. As JOHN et al (2002, p. 734) confirm, 'elite networks rarely identify with the South East region, nor do they mobilize behind regional institutions' (see also COCHRANE, 2006b ). Instead it may be better to think of the new political actors as forces operating in a looser, less centred operations and more distanciated in their relationships than traditional elites, the regional professionals nonetheless share a similar positioning in the new forms of governance to facilitators, brokers and policy assemblers (see also the discussion of what he calls the 'regional service class ' in LOVERING, 1999) . It is this which increasingly gives them their status as part of the wider governance structures.
Multi-level governance and beyond
One attempt to capture these new developments draws upon the notion of multi-level governance, a concept borrowed from political science and, in particular, from debates generated by the experience of the European Union and, more specifically, the working of the structural funds (see BACHE and FLINDERS, 2004 , HOOGHE and MARKS, 2003 , WARLEIGH, 2006 . It implies not only that 'governments' exist at a range of different geographical levels or scales, but also that they are increasingly interdependent and involved in a continuing process of negotiation across a range of policy fields. The notion of multi-level governance goes further to suggest that it is not just governments that matter, but also the relationships between, and the interdependence of, governments and non-governmental organizations and agencies. This approach seeks to locate the formal institutions of government alongside, but also within, more complex forms of networked governance. It is, however, difficult to avoid the fact that no matter how malleable the concept of scale has become -even when understood relationally -there is an implicit hierarchization of space that makes it difficult to entertain the kinds of transverse connection mobilized by the professional and business elites who configure the new governance arrangements. Geographical scale, as an ordering concept, is not without its uses as an indicator of the limits of jurisdictional or administrative spatial authority, but too often it is overextended in its use to frame processes that exceed or cross cut scalar boundaries (see BRENNER, 2001; JONAS, 2006; MARSTON et al, 2005) . At worst, scale is used to pre-define the boundaries of institutional activity before the political relationships and connections have been traced and understood. In trying to capture and for instance, has opened up a different kind of geographical potential for the region. In the past, the debate about regional policy has focused on differences in wealth between regions, but now each region has the task of identifying its own problems of social exclusion that need to be tackled. This brings with it the possibility of finding new ways of mobilizing resource through the new machineries of governance. We have already noted the way in which the most recent SEEDA strategy focuses on the 'challenges' the region faces, but intraregional inequality has also become a significant focus of attention.
A sharp contrast is drawn between the region's Western growth belt and its coastal fringes to the East and South which face problems of decline (in both tourism and other traditional industries). The old mining areas of north Kent and others with concentrations Were it not for the new machineries of governance, however, such political strategies might not have evolved in quite this manner. In the next section, we outline in greater detail the particular spatial assemblage of governance that has shaped the politics of a key site in the overall vision of a 'stretched' South East; namely the recent experience of Milton Keynes.
The new politics in practice: the Milton Keynes experience
Milton Keynes has a place at the centre of the (whether implicit or explicit) national regional strategy embedded in the Sustainable Communities Plan (ODPM, 2003) , and it has played a similar role in the South East since the late 1960s -as a growth pole even as other parts of Buckinghamshire resisted growth (see, e.g. BENDIXSON and PLATT, 1998 , pp. 1-32, CHARLESWORTH and COCHRANE, 1994 , CLAPSON, 2004 . The
Sustainable Communities Plan builds on this by identifying a Milton Keynes and South
Midlands sub-region which stretches from Corby in the North to Luton in the South and from Bedford in the East to Aylesbury in the West. This is a 'sub-region' that cuts across three sets of official regional boundaries. Milton Keynes (with a current population of 212,000) is expected to make a substantial contribution to the population growth targets for the sub-region, doubling in population to around 400,000 by 2030. The issue here is not whether this is a realistic vision of Milton Keynes' future, but, rather, how it works as a political framing or reframing. If the new town was originally envisaged as offering opportunities to those relocating from the 'overcrowded' central cities, the international city is about bringing the right sort of people to Milton Keynes to ensure that it is able to grow further and better, changing the nature of the local population so that it is attractive to employers in the knowledge industries (PIKE et al, 2006a, p.72) . The role of consultants is central to the process of politics in this new by SEERA 2006 at a regional level) that the community strategy has such an important part to play -setting out the terms on which 'Milton Keynes' is ready to play its part in achieving the growth targets set by national government -but in the process it is expected to be supported in this endeavour. It has thus become an important reference point for the later planning documents and business plans of Milton Keynes Partnership (see, GVA GRIMLEY et al, 2006) .
It is in this context that negotiation over infrastructure is so important. MKP is a 'partnership' in which the lead agency and its priorities are clear, but it too provides an arena within which negotiation may and does take place, particularly around the provision of social and other infrastructure required to underpin housing growth (for example, relating to transport linkages, the provision of health and education, and even investment in further and higher education). A tariff based system, through which a levy is paid by developers on each new house to help cover the costs of infrastructural development has been agreed (MILTON KEYNES PARTNERSHIP, 2006, pp. 43-51 suggests that while the balance may not be shifting directly and explicitly, the interdependence of the actors involved makes it difficult for those with formal executive powers to achieve their ends without extensive negotiation in which a range of sources of power may be mobilised by the actors involved. It is not that the multiplication of actors has simply led to a more complex form of government, but that the greater opportunities for a wider range of professionals and other bodies to mediate the decision-making process and mobilize resources independently of any central authority produces a spatial politics within which it is not always possible to know what particular advantages have been conferred upon actors by the new arrangement. Overlapping sets of political relations, networked across spaces which have little respect either for institutional levels or geographical scales, pushes us to think about a more distanciated, politics of 'the region'. In doing so, we might capture more of what is happening politically around our 'regional' institutions than if we try to filter everything through a scalar imagination.
'Regional' assemblages of power
If, as we have argued, we are witnessing the emergence of a more tangled, overlapping set of governance structures across the South East, this also has implications for how we understand the different power-plays that shape the politics of the regions. In an institutional setting where it is increasingly difficult to entertain a simple central versus regional government binary as more networked arrangements disrupt traditional, hierarchical forms of regulation and co-ordination, it becomes harder to pinpoint how governing agencies mobilize to secure, modify or translate their goals. If there are 'regional' institutional assemblages, made up of part-private, part-public agencies, as well as parts of central, regional and local government 'lodged' in spaces which fall within the constructed region, then there are also fragments of state authority, sections of business and any number of partnerships and agencies engaged in a 'politics of scale' to fix resources and stabilize geographical definitions to their advantage.
Increasingly, it would seem that there is little to be gained by talking about regional governance as a territorial arrangement when a number of the political elements 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 assemblages, rather than geographically tiered hierarchies of decision-making, lies with the tangle of interactions and capabilities within which power is negotiated and played out (see ALLEN, 1999) . There is, as we have tried to indicate, an interplay of forces where a range of actors mobilize, enrol, translate, channel, broker and bridge in ways that make different kinds of government possible. Some of this interplay takes place at arms length, mediated indirectly, some through relations of co-presence in a more distanciated fashion, and other forms of interaction are more direct in style, but together they amount to a more or less ordered assembly of institutional actors performing the 'region'.
As we have seen in the case of Milton Keynes, the presence of central government professionals in the institutional networks allows for the exercise of direct authority over plans and agendas, rather than relying wholly upon the remote imposition of targets and benchmarks. This is less government at-a-distance than the skilled negotiation of parameters, involving inducements that both steer as well as limit development possibilities. In a context where all authority is negotiated, the wider range of 'local' political actors does nonetheless open up the prospect of all manner of persuasive, and potentially manipulative, ploys to skew agendas and steer growth targets in directions that may not have been fully anticipated by 'national' actors (similar issues are explored by WHILE et al, 2004) . The case of consultant agencies, many drawn from much wider geographical networks, provides but one counter to the political authority of the centre in the form of technical expertise that enables 'regional' politicians and representatives to broker a consensus among those who need to be mobilised if a particular course of action AMIN et al, 2003) . Such capabilities, however, represent latent rather than actual qualities of power; they refer to the effective institutional resources and decision-making abilities which can be marshalled to great effect. Indeed, there is no question as to how effective and extensive such capabilities can be and have been over time; they encapsulate all that we understand by the term, state power. But such territorially embedded assets and resources are of less help when it is the actual practices of power that we wish to understand, rather than the concentration of abilities that lie behind them (see ALLEN, 2003) .
A top-down, centre-out account of central government power is an unhelpful starting point for any exploration of the practice of state power. There is a 'how' to power which is not satisfactorily answered by assertions of the unproblematic reach or delegation of 'centralized powers', where power is measured by the size of the territory which contains it. In fact, this question is all the more pressing for those who, like us, consider the governance of regions to be a predominantly relational affair, where power is a relational effect of political interaction, not a bloc of pre-formed decision-making powers or a distributed capability. In the foregoing, we have considered central government actors as part of 'regional' assemblages, not bodies which sit over or apart from the regions. Their manoeuvres and negotiations are entangled in regional governance structures, as are the effects of their actions, and it is through such relationships that the constraints and impositions of 'the centre' are likely to reveal themselves, not from afar like some remote authority or historical power bloc.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to challenge the idea of regions as fixed political spaces ordered by scale, but in doing so we are aware that we run the risk of sidelining England was simply 'unbounded', but that it, indeed any region, is made and remade by political processes which stretch beyond it and impact unevenly. To assert that regions are political constructs therefore, is not to suggest that such constructs 'contain' in some way the very governance relationship that 'invented' them. It would be wrong to collapse the two geographies, one the defined outcome of political endeavours, the other the tangled relationships which almost inevitably exceed the boundaries drawn. The likelihood of such excess is why we have tried to think through the emergence of a more diffuse and fragmented form of governance as a 'regional' assemblage, rather than as a series of regional institutions which are territorially fixed in some way.
It is worth stressing that by this we emphatically do not mean that 'regional' political institutions, or parts of them, have been networked in such a way that they no longer have a settled presence. We are not arguing that the professional and business elites owe their points of attachment to the networks rather than to the regions or that their relationships are simply embedded in flows of interaction not the peculiarities of the regional context.
On the contrary, it is the 'lodging' of a wide range of political actors drawn from the national as much as the local domain which gives a regional presence to the new governance arrangements. The political assemblage is 'regional' because that is what its capabilities speak to, not because its authority is defined by territorial parameters. The precise shape, mix and membership of such assemblages is a contingent affair, as can be witnessed across the South East, and their organizational logic is a cross-cutting mix of distanciated and proximate actions.
Such arrangements, whilst relatively novel in institutional terms, also raise questions about what kind of democratic politics is compatible with them. Some, such as and 'heterodox', with 'institutional experimentation' existing alongside a continued reliance on professional expertise. As a result, he points to the possibility of opening up the process to forms of democratic involvement, based on 'the discussion of contextsensitive and progressive alternatives based upon the inevitably messy historical evolution of orthodox and heterodox approaches, and the building of a more participatory determination of economic development priorities and policies' (PIKE, 2004 (PIKE, , p. 2158 . Keynes Council (again with the help of consultants) were able to mobilise the Local Strategic Partnership and its related partnerships to construct a vision for development which was intended to provide the starting point for the development planning (and infrastructural investment) to be taken on by Milton Keynes Partnership. These are merely indicative of some of the political possibilities inherent in a world of regional politics which (for good or ill) is not defined through clear-cut, scalar hierarchies of government, even if the options remain constrained by the more diffuse and tangled assemblages of governance. And wider possibilities are also raised by the strategies being developed. The regional politics of development are based around attempts to construct wider visions of change ('from new town to international city' is just one example of the slogans being mobilised to reflect this). In other words, the attempts to move beyond the negotiations about particular initiatives and to set broader ground rules within which they may be pursued also opens up scope for the generation of alternative sets of visions. In doing so, it creates the space for alternative political movements potentially from outside the charmed circle of the regional assemblage, albeit sometimes with leverage within it through existing democratic and popular institutions such as local councils, civic groups, trade unions, social movements and community organisations. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
